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1. Introduction
The hole argument of Earman and Norton (1987) is designed to establish a dilemma:
either give up the possibility of determinism in a wide class of spacetime theories, which they
believe substantivalists1 must do, or else embrace a principal called ‘Leibniz equivalence’
that identifies isomorphic models as representing one and the same physical situation, a
principle certainly necessary for relationalism but also thought by many to be sufficient
for relationalism. It would seem, then, that any resolution of the hole dilemma must
engage in major metaphysical maneuvering, as is typical of the enormous literature on
the hole argument. Recently, however, a number of authors have claimed metaphysical
excursions can be avoided and the dilemma dissolved if sufficient attention is paid to how
the mathematics used in the hole argument, and spacetime theories in general, applies
to the world2 (Weatherall 2018, Curiel 2018, Fletcher 2019). We think these attempts
are unsuccessful and intend to explain why, but not because we believe resolution of the
hole dilemma calls for metaphysical tinkering. For at the end we will suggest a resolution
that is non-metaphysical, at least to the extent that basic facts about reference are not
metaphysical.
2. Details of the Hole Argument
For those steeped in the literature, nothing is more painfully boring than yet another
rehearsal of the hole argument. Nonetheless, for readers unfamiliar with it and for the sake
of completeness, we will outline the argument. Veterans can skip ahead, although we will
register a few new points that have been by and large overlooked.
2.1. Einstein’s Hole Argument. The argument of Earman and Norton (1987) descends
from an argument Einstein had hit upon around 1912 in the course of discovering his field
equations, an argument he dubbed the Lochbetrachtung. Consider a solution to the field
equations which is such that the stress-energy tensor vanishes in a[n open] neighborhood
[with compact closure]. (This neighborhood is the so-called “hole”.) By leaving everything
1To be more precise, manifold substantivalists, i.e., those who take spacetime to be [represented by] the
bare manifold in models/solutions of general relativity (and any other spacetime theory that involves only
dynamical fields and no fixed background).
2For some earlier attempts at a non-metaphysical dissolution see (Leeds 1995) and (Mundy 1992). But also
see (Rynasiewicz 1996) for a critique of these attempts.
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outside the hole fixed but by smoothly distorting the manifold inside the hole, one arrives,
by general covariance, at second solution, which, though distinct from the first, is isomor-
phic to it. The conclusion Einstein drew is that general covariance is at odds with the “law
of causality” [Kausalgesetz], a Machian principle maintaining that the spacetime metric
(and thus inertial structure) is determined by specification of the mass-energy distribution
on the spacetime manifold. Einstein initially reacted by rejecting the demand of general
covariance. Only after a couple of years did he find a way to reinstate the requirement of
general covariance while retaining his Kausalgesetz. The key was to identify isomorphic
models as corresponding to one and the same physical situation, i.e., to adopt what Earman
and Norton call ‘Leibniz equivalence’.
Earman and Norton generalize Einstein’s argument in such a way that (i) the “hole”
need no longer be empty of sources3 and that (ii) just the possibility of determinism is used
in place of Einstein’s Kausalgesetz. But before giving the argument, we need the notion of
a pushforward or carry along of a mathematical object, as well as the reciprocal notion of
a pullback .
2.2. Pushforwards and Pullbacks. 4 Let M,N be equipollent sets and pi : M → N a
bijection. Furthermore, let FM and FN be the sets of real valued functions on M and N ,
respectively. There is a natural extension of pi to pi∗ : FM → FN given by pi∗(f) = f ◦ pi−1
for all f ∈ FM . Dropping the parentheses, pi∗f is referred to as the pushforward or carry
along of f . In the other direction, there is an extension of the inverse of pi to pi∗ : FN → FM
such that pi∗(g) = g ◦ pi for all g ∈ FN . Again, dropping the parentheses, pi∗g is called the
pullback of g.
If M and N are differential manifolds (perhaps of different dimensions), then FM and FN
are the sets of scalar fields on M and N , respectively. Moreover, the mapping pi also induces
a mapping5 pi∗ : Tp → Tpi(p), where Tp is the tangent space at point p ∈M , according to the
recipe (pi∗v)(f) = v(f ◦ pi). Let Tp∗ be the dual of Tp.6 Let v ∈ Tp and w ∈ Tpi(p)∗. Then pi
induces a further mapping pi∗ : Tpi(p)∗ → Tp∗ according to the formula (pi∗w)(v) = w(pi∗v).
Both pi∗ and pi∗ can be extended straightforwardly to arbitrary contravariant and covariant
tensors, respectively. If pi is furthermore a diffeomorphism, then pi∗, as well as pi∗, can be
extended to tensors of arbitrary types (m,n) by
(pi∗A)(w1, . . . , wm; v1, . . . , vn) = A(pi∗w1, . . . , pi∗wm; [pi−1]
∗
v1, . . . , [pi
−1]∗vn),
where A is a tensor of type (m,n), the wi’s covectors and the vi’s contravectors. We can
similarly define pi∗A.
3I.e., The stress-energy tensor need not vanish
4We follow the notation of mathematicians, who systematically write φ∗ for a pullback and φ∗ for a push-
forward. It is noteworthy that Wald (1984) reverses the two. Whether there is a tradition outside of
philosophy physics following this practice, we do not know.
5Technically, we should give this mapping a different name to distinguish it from the pushforward of scalar
fields. But since there are all sorts of geometric objects on a manifold, we would run out of notation if we
tried to give each pushforward its own name.
6Tp
∗ is the set of all linear functions from Tp to R.
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The notion of the pushforward (pullback) of an object is sufficiently general that it can
be defined for objects of almost any type, including non-tensorial geometric objects such
as the covariant derivative. This is not peculiar to differential geometry, but applies to
other categories of mathematical objects, as well, even models of arbitrary type. E.g., let
M := 〈M,O1, . . . , On〉 Then pi∗M := 〈M,pi∗O1, . . . , pi∗On〉.
2.3. Active vs. Passive Views of a Leibniz Shift. We specialize to the case of the
metric tensor of a Lorentzian spacetime. The treatment generalizes to tensors of arbitrary
type.
The goal here in relating the active and passive viewpoints is as follows. Let d : M →M
be a diffeomorphism, {xµ} a coordinate chart around p ∈M , and (d∗g)µν the components
in {xµ} of the pushforward of g by d. We’re looking for a coordinate chart {x′µ} such that,
at the point p, the equation
(1) (d∗gµν)(p) = g′µν(p)
holds, where g′µν(p) are the components of g in the chart {x′µ}. Then an active trans-
formation, which uses d and its pushforwards, can be be faithfully mirrored by a passive
transformation, according to which we view the same object (in this instance g) in differ-
ent coordinates. We then compute the pushforward of g(p) at the very same point p, thus
“moving the metric” but not the base space M .
The key to the solution is that we want the coordinates of d(p) in {x′µ} to be the same
as the coordinates of p in {xµ}, i.e.,
x′µ(d(p)) = xµ(p).
This is to say that the mappings xµ, x′µ, and d stand in the relation
xµ = x′µ ◦ d.
Composing each side with d−1,
x′µ = xµ ◦ d−1.
This yields the primed coordinate chart for which equation (1) holds.
Note that if d−1(p) lies in the domain of the chart {xµ}, we then have
(d∗gµν)(p) = gµν(d−1(p)).
This conforms with the expectation that, in terms of intrinsic quantities, d∗g(p) = g(d−1(p)).
Formulated in terms of fiber bundles, the difference between the active and the passive
is that, in the first instance, d induces a mapping of the bundle space that takes the fiber
over p of the base manifold to the fiber over its image to its image d(p). In the second
instance, each fiber is non-trivially mapped to itself. The result, in both cases, is to map one
section to another, the mapping being the same in both cases. Thus, although conceptually
different, the outcome of the two is the same and Wald is correct in claiming that in this
sense they are equivalent (1984, 439).
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2.4. The Earman-Norton Argument. Rather than to deal with arbitrary spacetime
theories, as do Earman and Norton, let us take the particular case of general relativity
from which we can generalize. The solutions to Einstein’s field equations, a.k.a. the
models of general relativity, have the form M := 〈M, g, T 〉 where M is a 4-dimensional
differential manifold, g a Lorentzian metric on M , and T the stress-energy tensor.7 Now
consider a diffeomorphism d : M → M that is not an automorphism of M. Call such a
mapping a ‘Leibniz shift’.
One key fact behind the hole argument is that ifM is a model of general relativity, then
any Leibniz shifted model d∗M is a model of the theory as well. Earman and Norton go to
some length to establish this by requiring that the models be fleshed out with additional
tensors, defined from g and T , so as to arrive at tensors that are everywhere 0.8 They then
take coordinate representations of these tensors in a chart and examine the coordinate
values under the Leibniz shift of that chart. However, all this is unnecessary. That the
Leibniz shift of a model is also a model is not a deep fact. For d is an isomorphism of M
onto d∗M, and the space of solutions to a set of equations is closed under isomorphism
just as the class of models of any theory in an abstract logic is closed under isomorphism.
Another key fact is that d can be selected such that it is the identity everywhere except
on an arbitrarily selected open subset H ⊂M with compact closure, and smoothly connects
with the identity map on the boundary of H. This suffices to show that the values of the
field quantities everywhere outside of H fail to determine those in H.
Now suppose it is held that distinct models represent distinct physical situations, a
principle elsewhere know as model literalism (Rynasiewicz 1994). Earman and Norton
presume that substantivalism is committed to model literalism based on an “acid test”
Leibniz proposed to Samuel Clarke in their famous correspondence. If absolute space is
something real, then God could have created a different world in which all bodies are
displaced a fixed distance in a fixed direction. Generalizing, the acid test is then that
substantivalism is wedded to the idea that a Leibniz shifted model represents a state of
affairs distinct from that which the original model represents. This leads to a dilemma for
the substantivalist. Take any model M of general relativity that can be foliated into a
one-parameter set of global time slices. Select one of these time slices S as the present, and
select a temporal orientation in order to distinguish past from future. Place the hole H in
the future of S. ThenM and d∗M agree on all facts up to and including S but fail to agree
thereafter. Hence, if they represent distinct situations, as the substantivalist allegedly must
hold, then general relativity is a wildly indeterministic theory. Earman and Norton brand
this special form of indeterminism as ‘radical local indeterminism’. The resulting dilemma
for substantivalists is that they must either (a) embrace radical local indeterminism for
general relativity and any other spacetime theory that has no fixed background geometry,
7To be more perspicuous, we should write, using Wald’s (1984) abstract index notation, 〈M, gab, T ab〉 as
the generic form of a solution to the Einstein field equations. However, the abstract indices are merely
heuristic, and to keep them throughout would prove tedious.
8In this case form the Einstein tensor G as well as the tensor G− T , which, in light of the field equations,
is everywhere zero.
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or else (b) give up substantivalism by embracing a principle Earman and Norton call
’Leibniz equivalence’: isomorphic models represent one and the same physical situation.
A word of caution. Earman and Norton do not insist that our spacetime theories must be
deterministic. Rather, at stake is the very possibility of determinism, and, quite sensibly,
they suggest that we should not allow metaphysics to commit us to indeterminism (or
determinism) a priori.
2.5. Diffeomorphisms Are Not Needed. As we have seen, it is unnecessary to define
vanishing tensors for the hole argument to go through. It is also unnecessary that the
Leibniz shifting be done via a diffeomorphism. Any permutation will do as long as we use
the permutation to pushforward the atlas of the manifold.
We can think of a smooth manifold M as an ordered pair 〈S, T ,A〉, where S is a bare
point set, T the topology, and A a complete C∞ atlas on S. In general, a C∞ atlas A on
M is a collection of mappings ϕα, called coordinate charts, such that (a) for each p ∈ M
there exists a chart ϕα ∈ A with p ∈ dom ϕα, i.e., {dom ϕα} covers S, (b) each ϕα is
a bijection with some open U ⊆ Rn, and (c) any two coordinate charts ϕα, ϕβ ∈ A are
C∞ related in the sense that if dom ϕα ∩ dom ϕβ 6= ∅, then ϕα ◦ ϕβ−1 and ϕβ ◦ ϕα−1 are
C∞ maps. Let pi : S → S be any permutation on S, and let pi∗T be the pushforward of
T , i.e., pi∗T = {pi[U ] | U ∈ T }. Hence 〈S, pi∗T 〉 is homeomorphic to 〈S, T 〉, pi being a
homeomorphism. Finally, the pushforward pi∗A of the atlas A is {ϕ ◦ pi−1 | ϕ ∈ A}. It
follows that 〈S, pi∗T , pi∗A〉 is diffeomorphic to 〈S, T ,A〉, again pi being a diffeomorphism.
Thus, the hole argument can be run with any permutation of the underlying point set that
is the identity map on S outside the hole. That mere permutations of the underlying point
set suffice suggests that the hole argument is a special case of a more general consideration.
We will return to this in the penultimate section.
2.6. Metaphysical Responses. Substantivalists of different stripes have marshalled an
array of responses to the hole argument. While the aim of this paper is not to deal with
metaphysical replies, we will give a (non-exhaustive) outline of some of the most prominent
responses.
One response attempts to add some sort of essentialism to the metric of spacetime. Tim
Maudlin (1989, 1990) argues that a physical spacetime cannot exist without a set of metrical
relations. Since these metrical relations are essential to the spacetime, spacetimes differing
only with regards to metrical relations are necessarily non-identical. In effect, the spacetime
points have their location in the manifold essentially fixed by the metrical relations. So,
for some point p ∈ H, if p is assigned a new metrical value by some diffeomorphism d, then
d ∗ (p) ∈ H is not the same point as p and therefore lacks p′s essential metrical properties.
So any Leibniz shifted model d ∗ M that does not leave the essential metrical relations
intact does not represent a physical state of affairs at all. Hence, the hole argument is
obviated, since this is exactly the situation that the hole argument describes.
Another metaphysically motivated response to Earman and Norton is given by Jeremy
Butterfield (1989). Using David Lewis’ counterpart theory, Butterfield denies the transworld
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identity of spacetime points. 9 So, if two models contain the same spacetime points, then
only one model is a representation of a possible world. This view resolves the hole argu-
ment, since a Leibniz shifted model d ∗M will contain the same spacetime points as the
modelM. Considering this within the context of counterpart theory, only one of the mod-
els represents a possible physical state of affairs and so no indeterminism. For objections
to the modal responses of Maudlin and Butterfield see Earman (1989), Brighouse (1994)
and Rynasiewicz (1994).
The previous responses attempt to deny Leibniz equivalence, and yet protect space-
time substantivalism from the hole argument. A set of more sophisticated (and slightly
less metaphysical) responses attempt to argue that the substantivalist can accept Leibniz
equivalence and yet remain true to substantivalism. Carl Hoefer (1996) argues that the
representation of spacetime is given entirely by the metric tensor, and not the manifold
+ metric (which is Maudlin’s view). The role of the manifold is to give continuity and
topological properties to the spacetime that is expressed by the metric field, but we should
take the metric tensor to be representing the physically salient aspects of spacetime. He
calls this view ‘metric field substantivalism’. Another variant of this sophisticated sub-
stantivalism is advocated by Carolyn Brighouse (1994). She argues that our individuation
of spacetime points is done relative to qualitative similarity (in line with the identity of
indiscernibles). If this is the standard then isomorphic models are equivalent and this
judgment can be rendered independently of a view on the existence of spacetime points.
Since this amounts to an admission of Leibniz equivalence, the hole argument is avoided.
Other forms of sophisticated substantivalism have been defended by Maidens (1992) and
Dasgupta (2011). For some responses to sophisticated substantivalism see Belot (1995)
and Brighouse (2018).
3. On Weatherall
Weatherall (2018) contends that excursions into metaphysics are unnecessary in order to
come to grips with the hole argument. As he puts it, “if one adopts the standard formalism
of relativity theory, on which one represents spacetime with a Lorentzian manifold, the hole
argument does not force one to confront a metaphysical dilemma” (p. 344). Instead, he
claims, the force of the argument vanishes if one considers carefully how the relevant math-
ematics applies to the world. His dissolution of the hole argument proceeds by adopting
certain theses about applied mathematics.
(1) The equivalence of models of general relativity (or any other theory) is a purely
mathematical issue.
(2) Isomorphism is the mathematical standard of equivalence.
(3) Equivalent mathematical models have the same representational capacities.
(4) Isomorphic models can be compared only relative to the choice of a particular
isomorphism.
The last of these is absolutely essential for Weatherall’s purposes.
9Lewis’ counterpart theory asserts that no object can occupy more than one possible world. Qualitative
duplicates across possible worlds are non-identical counterparts. For more cf. Lewis (1968, 1973).
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3.1. Application to the Hole Argument. The hole argument then falters as follows.
Let 〈M, g〉 be a Lorentzian spacetime10 and d a Leibniz shift. Thus, 〈M, g〉 6= 〈M,d∗g〉
since d∗g 6= g. However, d is an isometry from 〈M, g〉 to 〈M,d∗g〉. Isometry in this instance
is isomorphism, and thus the two models are equivalent and have the same representational
capacities.
To conclude immediately from this that they represent the same physical situation is
clearly a nonsequitur.11 And although Weatherall sometimes appears to draw this infer-
ence, (4) above is needed for the argument for his thesis to go through. Let p ∈ M be
such that g(p) 6= d∗g(p). (In the hole argument, the point p lies in the “hole”.) It thus
appears that the two models represent different physical states of affairs. But according
to (4), this comparison is implicitly relative to the identity map 1M on M . Yet 1M is
not an isomorphism from 〈M, g〉 to 〈M,d∗g〉, and therefore, by (4), is not a candidate for
comparing the two models. Instead, one should use the isomorphism d. Relative to d, the
point corresponding to p is d(p), and it is trivially the case that g(p) = d∗g(d(p)) Since
this holds for all points (inside and outside the hole), it follows that 〈M,d∗g〉 represents
the same physical situation as 〈M, g〉. So, radical local indeterminism is avoided.
3.2. Illustration with the Additive Group of Integers. In order to make the template
of the argument clearer, Weatherall asks us, as a warm-up exercise, to consider the additive
group of integers 〈Z,+, 0〉, where 0 is selected as a distinguished element since it serves as
the additive identity element. Now, because 〈Z,+, 0〉 has no automorphisms other than
the identity map on Z, any non-trivial permutation generates a distinct but isomorphic
model. E.g., let f : Z → Z be given by the rule f(n) = n + 1. This induces the structure
〈Z, f∗+, f∗0〉, where f∗0 = 1 and (f∗+)(n,m) = n + m − 1. For ease of notation, write
0∗ for f∗0 and +∗ for f∗(+), The map f is a group isomorphism since f(0) = 0 and
f(n + m) = f(n)+f(m). Thus, according to Weatherall’s (2), the two structures are
equivalent. In virtue of that, according to Weatherall, there is a sense in which both are
just the group of integers under addition. But then, asks Weatherall, just what is the
identity element of this group? According to the one model, it is the element 0; according
to the other, it is 0 = 1. So, it is alleged, there appears to be an ambiguity. Weatherall
has two responses, one syntactic, the other model-theoretic.
The syntactic response is that we have a case of a trivial notational variation “where we
assign the symbols ‘0’ or ‘1’ to the identity in 〈Z,+, 0〉 and the symbol ‘0’ to the identity
in 〈Z,+, 0〉” (p. 333).
The model-theoretic response brings to bear assumption (4) above, viz., that isomorphic
models can be compared only relative to the choice of a particular isomorphism. The
ambiguity arises from choosing different mappings. Given the same domain of discourse Z
10That is to say, g is a Lorentzian metric on M . Weatherall drops the stress-energy tensor T from the
models of general relativity on the grounds that T is definable from g using the field equations. We prefer
taking the space of all triples 〈M, g, T 〉 and then taking the models of general relativity to be those that
satisfy the field equations. However, nothing of substance in evaluating Weatherall’s position hinges on the
difference.
11Of the form: possibly P, therefore P.
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in the two models, one is tempted to use the identity map 1Z. This might be appropriate
for Z qua set, says Weatherall. But qua group, the two models should be compared by the
group isomorphism f .12 Relative to f , the integer corresponding to the identity element 0
is f(0) = 1. This, according to Weatherall, resolves the ambiguity.
3.3. Critique of Weatherall. What are we to make of this? Let’s take the warm-up
example first.
3.3.1. Critique Regarding the Additive Group of Integers. It’s pretty clear that the philos-
ophy of math, or of applied math, espoused is heavily influenced by category theory and
mathematical structuralism. This is not the occasion to delve into a full scale discussion of
these. Suffice it to say that Weatherall’s assumption (4) is not a standard part of either,
but a tenet of his philosophy of applied math suggested to him by these and rendered
evident from the example of the additive group of integers. But what Weatherall took to
be uncontroversial is in fact almost the same consideration one of us has used in class as a
test case for structuralism.
To show that the situation is not as clear as he thinks, let us move to a more mini-
mal characterization of groups. It’s well known that a first-order axiomatization of group
theory requires but one extralogical symbol, viz., a two-place function symbol for group
composition. The models thus have the simpler form 〈G, ◦〉. The axioms assert the ex-
istence of an element with the properties of the identity element, and it is then provable
that there is a unique element having those properties. That is to say that the identity
element is definable in terms of group composition from the axioms. So, it is unnecessary
to introduce an individual constant symbol for it. This is not to say that the (pseudo)worry
over what element is really the additive identity can no longer be formulated, albeit much
less directly. But moving to the minimal setting allows us to focus on the addition function
and its pushforward under f . (You’ll recall that in the example f(p) = p + 1.) We have
the models 〈Z,+〉 and, using notation initially introduced, 〈Z, f∗+〉. We can ask whether
+ and f∗+ are one and the same operation on Z. The answer has to be flat out ‘no’ in
light of the fact that f is not an automorphism of 〈Z,+〉. Thus, it is inappropriate to say
that f∗+ is simply a notational variant on +. If that were the case, the two models would
be one and the same, which they are not. The bottom line is that the operation n + m
on Z is distinct from the operation n + m − 1. There is, of course, the skeptical worry
whether ‘+’ really refers to + and not to f∗+.13 But whatever ‘+’ refers to, ‘f∗+’ refers
to something else.
12For some reason Weatherall insists on a distinction between the map f : Z → Z qua set bijection and
f qua group isomorphism, which he writes as f : 〈Z,+, 0〉 → 〈Z,+, 0〉. I suspect that Weatherall has in
mind that, in the category of sets, the arrow from the object Z to itself corresponding to f is distinct from
the arrow in the category of groups that goes from 〈Z,+, 0〉 to 〈Z,+, 0〉. But in the current context, the
language is not that of category theory, but of some standard set theory (say ZF or ZFC) in which we have
direct access to the interior of the objects related by arrows. And this leads to oddities in putting the tilde
over f . For example, what is the domain or codomain of f?
13This is not a worry we have.
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3.3.2. Critique of the Dissolution of the Hole Argument. Let us first comment on Weather-
all’s first three theses above before turning to the crucial fourth. Claim (2), that isomor-
phism is the mathematical standard of equivalence, seems plausible enough, although one
needs to be wary. E.g., there are two equivalent ways of formulating the theory of Boolean
algebras. One characterizes them relationally as special sorts of partial orderings meeting
additional conditions (orthocomplemented lattices). The models have the form 〈B,≤〉.
The other presents them algebraically so that the models have the form 〈B,+, ·, ,¯ 0, 1〉.
There can be no question of isomorphism between models of the first type and models of
the second even though for each model of one type there is an equivalent model of the
other type in the sense that the order relation is definable from the algebraic operations
and vice versa. This suggests that being equivalent is a bit broader than being isomorphic.
Weatherall’s thesis (3), that equivalent mathematical models have the same representa-
tional capacities, sounds safe enough, especially if we substitute ‘isomorphic’ for ‘equiva-
lent’. But, as we have just seen, equivalence is plausibly broader. A worry is that sameness
of representational capacity might be the standard for mathematical equivalence, assum-
ing we had an independent handle on ‘representational’. Or, it may be that the handle
on sameness of representational capacity derives from mathematical equivalence, in either
case rendering (3) uninformative.
In any event, the motivation for (1), that the equivalence of models of general relativity
(or any other theory) is a purely mathematical issue, is unclear since there are a number
of prima facie distinct senses of equivalence used in connection with physical theory, e.g.,
physical equivalence, empirical or observational equivalence, etc., that are not necessarily
a matter of model isomorphism. So, here we need to be especially clear on the sense
of ‘equivalence of models’ prior to claiming that mathematics provides the standard in
the form of isomorphism. It may be that Weatherall has in mind the tight standard
of mathematical equivalence for he writes, “isometry provides the only sense in which
. . . spacetimes are mathematically equivalent’ (p. 337). But then he goes on to claim that
the existence of an isometry “provides the only sense in which . . . spacetimes are empirically
equivalent” (Ibid , emphasis ours), which is dubious. General relativity has models that
are arguably observationally equivalent yet differ in global topology. (See (Glymour 1977),
(Malament 1977) and (Manchak 2009).14)
Nevertheless, we should wonder how a criterion dictated by mathematics alone is capable
of blocking the hole argument, especially in light of what’s said in footnote 9. There we
find:
I take mathematical models to be devices that we use for representational
purposes, not objects that stand in some context- or use-independent rela-
tion to physical situations that they represent. (p. 332)
We couldn’t agree more. But this presents a puzzle. If the way that physicists use mathe-
matical models is context dependent, then we might expect that the physical equivalence
of models is also context dependent. If so, how could the equivalence of models be a purely
mathematical issue?
14This same point is made in an unpublished paper by Roberts (2014).
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The crux of Weatherall’s argument though is assumption (4), that isomorphic models
can be compared only relative to the choice of a particular isomorphism. By ‘comparison’,
Weatherall has in mind (at least) point by point comparison. The choice of an isomorphism
d : M → M is supposed to tell us which points to compare with which: corresponding to
p is d(p). These are to be treated as if they were the same point. In fact, well after setting
up the hole argument by Leibniz shifting a model by d and arguing that the hole argument
is blocked by relativizing comparisons of isomorphic models to a particular isomorphism,
Weatherall announces he takes his argument to involve a passive transformation and not
an active map. Now there are a number of points to be made. in response to the preceding,
some concerning the active-passive distinction, some concerning the cogency of the need
to relativize any comparison to a choice of isomorphism. Let’s take these in order.
According to Weatherall,
“The distinction between passive and active diffeomorphisms . . . is supposed
to arise in the context of the action of an induced pushforward map on some
field. The passive interpretation of such a map is supposed to correspond to
a (mere) re-labelling of of points, effectively leaving the fields unchanged.”
(p.339)
As we saw in §2.3, points indeed are “relabeled” but we do not have a mere relabeling.
The fields are not left unchanged. That would be just a matter of covariance. Rather the
introduction of a new chart facilitates the definition of new, boosted fields. Weatherall
goes on to write, “The active interpretation . . . involves keeping the points unchanged (i.e.,
by somehow fixing the labels of the points, perhaps with a local coordinate system) and
assigning fields differently to each point” (Ibid .) This a bit misleading. For one, no “fixing
of labels” in the form of the introduction of coordinate charts was necessary. For another,
the pushforward of a geometric object at point p is defined, not at p, but at d(p). In this
sense, it’s untrue that the points remain “unchanged”.
Now, concerning the cogency of the need to relativize any comparison to a choice of
isomorphism, there’s no doubt that if we have a pair of isomorphic models 〈M, g, T 〉 and
〈M ′, g′, T ′〉 such that M and M ′ are disjoint, then comparisons can be made only relative
to some bijection f : M → M ′, and if f is an isomorphism, then they have the same
representational capacity. Indeed, f can be thought of as providing a criterion of trans-
model identity. This is reminiscent of doing counterpart theory on David Lewis’s version
of possible world metaphysics, which holds that an individual can exist in no more than
one possible world. Weatherall’s insistence that, when M = M ′, we still need a mapping
relative to which comparisons are made is tantamount to insisting that we must do coun-
terpart theory with mathematical models having the same point set.15 But why is this
necessary when we already have a perfectly good criterion of trans-model identity, to wit,
numerical identity? Our judgment that, under the diffeomorphism d : M →M , d∗M 6=M
presupposes the use of the numerical identity of the manifold points. For if we say, for
all p ∈ M , that d(p) is the same as p, then we end up with numerically the same model.
Another way of putting this is that the very distinction between an automorphism and a
15Only without the restriction that a point can exists in no more than one spacetime model.
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Leibniz shift presupposes that we use numerical identity in comparing the original with its
pushforward. If we used the diffeomorphism as a criterion for point identity across models,
we could never produce a Leibniz shift to begin with. Now, Weatherall might take that
as another way of blocking the hole argument. But it would make a complete mess of
mathematics and force us to conclude that every permutation of the domain of discourse
of a model is a symmetry of the model.
Moreover, whatever plausibility (4) might have had in the context of the hole argument
depends crucially on the premise that undressed spacetime points cannot be directly de-
tected. Weatherall’s philosophy of applied mathematics, if cogent, should apply to cases
in which elements of the domain of discourse represent readily observable items. Take the
case of a relational structure M = 〈M,R〉, where R ⊆M ×M . Let M = {1, 2} and let R
be <. Suppose furthermore that M represents the situation in which Thing 1 is smaller
than Thing 2, where Thing 1 and Thing 2 are as in the Dr. Seuss story—readily observable.
Now let pi : M → M interchange 1 and 2. Then, we should all agree the Leibniz shifted
model represents the situation in which Thing 2 is smaller than Thing 1. Yet, according
to Weatherall’s (4), the comparison of the two structures must be done relative to the
isomorphism pi, yielding the verdict that they represent the same situation.
The bottom line is that assumption (4), depending on how it is implemented, leads either
to internal inconsistency, or else to triviality. Weatherall tells us,
“When we say that (M, g) and (M,d∗g) are isometric spacetimes, and thus
that they have all the same invariant, observable structure, we are compar-
ing them relative to d. Indeed, we must because, as in the previous example,
there is no sense in which 1M either is or gives rise to an isometry.” (pp.
336).16
We take it that what Weatherall means is that when 1M is not an isometry of (M, g)
onto (M,d∗g). He goes on, “In other words, relative to 1M , (M, g) and (M,d∗g) are not
equivalent, physically or otherwise.” (Ibid).
In using isomorphisms as standards of comparison,if we use a single isomorphism for the
entire equivalence class of Leibniz-shifted models, then the use of (4) becomes internally
inconsistent. Suppose that d 6= d ◦ d. Then, Weatherall will tell us that because d is
an isomorphism from (M, g) to (M,d∗g), that (M, g) is physically equivalent to (M,d∗g).
Furthermore, since d is an isomorphism from (M,d∗g) on (M,d∗d∗g) that (M,d∗g) is
physically equivalent to (M,d∗d∗g). But, since d 6= d◦d, d is not an isomorphism of (M, g)
onto (M,d∗d∗g), violating the transitivity of equivalence. Thus, using a single isomorphism
leads to internal inconsistency.
If, however, Weatherall maintains that we should use different isomorphisms as standards
of comparison for different pairs of isomorphic models, the application of (4) becomes trivial
in that it says nothing more than that isomorphic models represent the same physical
situation, in other words, that we should use Leibniz equivalence. But, this just begs the
question, since Weatherall assumes Leibniz equivalence to argue for Leibniz equivalence.
16We have altered the notation to conform with ours.
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4. Other Actors
At least one author consciously follows Weatherall (Fletcher 2019). Another says he is
quite sympathetic to Weatherall’s approach (Curiel 2018). and offers up a non-metaphysical
treatment of the hole argument. We’d best take a look at these, one at a time.
4.1. Fletcher. In his introduction, Fletcher (2019) writes, “I agree with Weatherall’s re-
sponse to the hole argument” (§1). For sure he accepts Weatherall’s thesis (3) that math-
ematically equivalent models have the same representational capacities. But we are a bit
puzzled, because when he turns to discuss the hole argument he follows a different course.
He does not take it that isomorphic mathematical models must represent one and the same
physical situation. ”Yet”, he says, ”if this represented state of affairs, is not unique, then
the problem of indeterminism seems to rise again, forcing one to confront a metaphysical
dilemma anew” (§5.2). He goes on to say “the error implicit in this concern is the as-
sumption that Lorentzian manifolds, as mathematical models, represent all properties of
a physical relativistic spacetime. . . ” (Ibid). As he argues earlier, “some properties are ab-
stracted away – such as the representation of units or additional structure, e.g., additional
fields . . . ” (Ibid). But, how one does this to avoid radical local indeterminism is a bit of
a mystery to us. A hint of how this might work, though, might be gleaned from another
example in which isomorphic models represent distinct physical situations.
Consider the case of a single point mass in Minkowski spacetime, that follows an inertial
trajectory up until some time t, when the particle swerves and begins to accelerate. The
pertinent question to ask is whether this is a genuine case of indeterminism, in other words
could the swerve have taken place at a different time or in a different direction. Fletcher
proceeds to deal with this via the following steps. First is to describe the particle, which can
be described by the triple (R4, η, γ) where η is the Minkowski metric and γ : R→ R4 is the
particle worldline. Second, let T be a non-trivial time translation in Minkwoski spacetime
by a fixed time.17 Third, one must select some isomorphism d : R4 → R4 as a standard
of comparison for evaluating relations between models. Fletcher asks us to consider the
model (M,η, (T ◦ d)[γ]) and asks whether if by pulling back by d−1 we arrive at (R4, η, γ).
He concludes that, unless (d−1 ◦ T ◦ d) = T , then (R4, η, (T ◦ d)[γ]) “represents” a time
translation relative to d.18 In contrast, if (T ◦ d) is the standard of comparison, then “it
would not represent any difference at all.” (Fletcher 2019, §5.2). He claims that this leads
to the conclusion that “the swerve models do not represent exactly one state of affairs...”
(§5.2), that is that the swerve theory is indeterministic. This is not just relative to d, but
categorically so.19
One way to arrive at this conclusion is with the suppressed premise that if there is a
difference relative to some isomorphism d, then (R4, η, γ) and (R4, η, T [γ]) represent distinct
17Fletcher uses both a time translation T and a rotation R of Minkowski space, but for simplicity we will
restrict our attention to the time translation.
18By “represents” we take it that he means “constitutes” and not represents in the sense in which a model
represents a physical situation.
19We are not entirely sure what it would mean to say that a theory is indeterministic relative to a choice
of isomorphism.
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physical situations. But in the context of the hole argument such a standard of comparison
is always available. Take for example the identity map. One then wonders why it is not the
case in the hole argument that one doesn’t similarly conclude that Leibniz-shifted models
represent distinct situations. If this is not the missing premise, then we are at a loss as to
why we should take time translations relative to some isomorphism other than the Leibniz
shift itself.
4.2. Curiel. Curiel’s (2018) attempted dissolution of the hole argument rests on a distinc-
tion between applying a diffeomorphism to the manifold cum metric and applying it to the
metric field alone. Both he takes it are mathematically well-defined,. But, as Curiel points
out, not every mathematical operation admits a physically significant interpretation. The
example he gives is using a real vector space to represent Newtonian space. In this space,
3-vectors represent spatial points. It makes perfect mathematical sense to add the vectors,
but the addition of spatial points is not physically significant. This might not be entirely
convincing, since the usual treatment of space using vectors is with R4 as an affine space,
not a vector space. In affine space, it makes physical sense to add vectors by placing the
tail of a vector at the head of another vector. Nonetheless, the point is well taken. For
example, in classical electrodynamics a transformation A
′
= A+∇λ of the vector potential
A by a scalar function λ is certainly mathematically well-defined, but it doesn’t result in
a physically significant operation.
His rehearsal of the hole argument casts the pushforward of the metric as applying a
diffeomorphism to the metric field sine manifold. Curiel takes this to be a mathematically
well-defined operation, but not a physically meaningful one. Furthermore, if one interprets
the pushforward as a diffeomorphism of the metric cum manifold, then one is just giving
a diffeomorphic presentation of the same abstract mathematical object.
So, we have two complaints to register. The first concerns diffeomorphic presentations
and mappings of the metric cum manifold. Curiel has an unorthodox take on the nature of
mathematical entities. In general, isomorphic structures are merely different presentations
of a single underlying abstract entity. For example, he takes S2 and R2 with a point added at
infinity as different presentations of one and the same entity (p.453, fn.5) Similarly, a group
is an abstract entity with different concrete presentations. And a differential manifold is
an abstract object that has different “diffeomorphic presentations”. We are not quite sure
what to make of this. One reading is that these abstract objects are like Platonic forms
standing in a relation of one over the many. Alternatively, the abstract objects might be
construed simply as equivalence classes of concrete isomorphic presentations. In a footnote,
he mentions that if one takes a manifold to be an equivalence class of its diffeomorphic
presentations, then “. . . the operation underlying the hole argument does not make even
mathematical sense.” (p.453, fn.5). But it’s not very comforting to have a dissolution of the
hole argument depend on such unorthodoxy. Perhaps worse is that Curiel simply assumes
that isomorphic presentations are physically equivalent., in that they represent the same
intrinsic physical structure (p. 453).
Our second complaint cuts deeper. It turns out that what Curiel means by a mapping
of the manifold cum metric in terms of fiber bundles takes a fiber over a point p to a fiber
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over point d(p) (Personal correspondence). As we argued in §2.3, this corresponds to the
active picture of Leibniz shifts. Alternatively, a mapping of the metric sine manifold in this
context is given by the assignment (p, g(p)) 7→ (p, g(d−1p)). If the bundle trivializes, this
corresponds to the passive picture of Leibniz shifts. Again, as we argued in §2.3, the two
points of view yield the same mapping of a section of the bundle to a section of the bundle.
So, it turns out that Curiel takes active transformations, but not passive, to be physically
meaningful, and moreover, models related by an active transformation are simply assumed
to be physically equivalent. As with Weatherall, Curiel simply assumes Leibniz equivalence
with no underlying brief for it.
5. Where We Stand
Does all this mean that we think that the only way to cope with the hole argument is
to bring some metaphysical doctrine to bear on it?
No. We think that the hole argument is an instance of a general permutation argument
used for various purposes by Quine (1969), then Davidson (1979), and then Putnam (1981),
but all focused on the problem of reference.20 Although we do not necessarily endorse their
separate diagnoses as to what to conclude, we agree that reference lies at the heart of the
matter. Limitations of space do not permit us to rehearse their permutation arguments
or to provide a general account for spacetime theories, much can be gleaned from the two
most notorious cases: the hole argument and the Leibniz shift argument originally given
by Leibniz in his correspondence with Clarke.
Take the case of the hole argument. Assume for the sake of argument that we have
established a correlation between actual spacetime events and manifold points up through
the time-slice S on which M and d∗M agree. Ask then, will we ever be able to come to
know which model (if either) correctly captures the values of the object fields in the hole
H? Prerequisite to this is to be able to identify the individual points in H. This might
seem child’s play, since at each point there’s a coordinate chart in the atlas including that
point in its domain so one just has to pick a chart to use. But that overlooks the problem
of how to establish a chart physically. One way to do this is with Gaussian normal (or
synchronous) coordinates. Assume that somehow a spatial chart has been fixed for a three
dimensional neighborhood U of p in the causal past of H on the present hypersurface S
Suppose furthermore that the metric tensor is known at each point of U and that we have
test particles so that geodesics with tangents normal to S can be traced into the future.21
Then we can take the spatial components along a geodesic γ to be the same as at the
intersection with S and the time coordinate to be the lapsed proper time. Let ϕ be the
resulting chart. Unfortunately, precisely the same physical recipe is to be followed if we
want to trace out geodesics d∗γ = d ◦ γ to establish the chart d∗ϕ. We are left with
mathematical differences where there is no physical difference.
Now take the case of Leibniz’s use of a Leibniz shift. If God had placed the entire contents
of the universe some fixed distance, say, to the east, would we have a different, or the
20That permutations alone suffice was established in §2.4.
21For the sake of argument suppose they do not encounter singularities or intersect before or in H.
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same physical situation? Weatherall’s apparatus of comparisons relative to isomorphisms
dictates ’same’, even if one is a proponent of absolute space. On our view, there is no
problem of having secured reference to spacetime points in question. Hence, the adherent
of absolute space has no problem answering ‘different’.
6. Conclusion
We laud the efforts of Weatherall, Fletcher and Curiel in seeking ways of blocking the
hole argument without entering into metaphysical considerations concerning modality and
the nature of spacetime. For we, too, believe that the hole argument can be so blocked.
However, we have found each of these attempts wanting in one way or another. We con-
clude, not that metaphysical consideration are inevitable in order to avoid the dilemma
posed by the hole argument. Rather, we believe that the problem can be resolved based
on considerations of how it is that we are able to refer to spacetime points in general and
how in certain crucial cases, such as in the hole argument, we are unable to do so. Hence,
Leibniz equivalence is the proper posture to adopt with respect to the Cauchy problem in
general relativity, but not with respect to the original acid test posed by Leibniz.
References
[1] Belot, G. [1995]: ‘New work for counterpart theorists.’ British Journal for Philosophy of Science 46(2),
185–195.
[2] Brighouse, C. [1994]: ‘Spacetime and Holes’, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy
of Science Association, 1994, pp. 117–25.
[3] Brighouse, C. [2018]: ‘Confessions of a (Cheap) Sophisticated Substantivalist.’ Foundations of Physics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-018-0228-2.
[4] Butterfield, J. [1989]: ‘The Hole Truth’, British Journal for Philosophy of Science, 40, pp. 1–28.
[5] Curiel, E. [2018]: ‘On the Existence of Spacetime Structure’, British Journal for Philosophy of Science,
69, 447-483.
[6] Dasgupta, S. [2011]: ‘The bare necessities’. Philosophical Perspectives 25(1), 115–160
[7] Earman, J. [1989] World Enough and Spacetime: Absolute vs. Relational Theories of Space and Time.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
[8] Earman, J. and Norton, J. [1987]: ‘What Price Substantivalism? The Hole Story’, British Journal for
Philosophy of Science, 38, 515-525.
[9] Fletcher, S. [2018]: ‘On Representational Capacities with an Application to General Relativity’,
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-018-0208-6.
[10] Glymour, C. [1977]: ‘Indistinguishable Spacetimes and the Fundamental Group’, in Foundations of
Space Time Theories, Eds. J. Earman, C. Glymour, J. Statchel, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press.
[11] Hoefer, C. [1996], ‘The Metaphysics of Space-Time Substantivalism,’ Journal of Philosophy, 93: 5–27.
[12] Leeds, S. [1995]: ‘Holes and Determinism: Another Look’, Philosophy of Science 62:425-437.
[13] Lewis, D. [1968]: ‘Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic’, Journal of Philosophy, 65, pp.
113-26.
[14] Lewis, D. [1973]: Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell.
[15] Maidens, A. [1992]: ‘EARMAN JOHN S. 1989: World Enough and Space-Time: Absolute versus
Relational Theories of Space and Time Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, xiv + 233 pp. (including bibliography
and index). British Journal for Philosophy of Science, 43, 129-136.
16 CHRISTOPHER ARLEDGE AND ROBERT RYNASIEWICZ
[16] Malament, D. [1977]: ‘Observationally Indistinguishable Spacetimes: Comments on Glymour’s Paper’,
in Foundations of Space Time Theories, Eds. J. Earman, C. Glymour, J. Statchel, Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press.
[17] Manchak, J.B. [2009]: ‘Can we know the global structure of spacetime?’, Studies in the History and
Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 40:53-56.
[18] Maudlin, T. [1988]: ‘The Essence of Spacetime’, Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy
of Science Association, 1988 pp. 82–91.
[19] Maudlin, T. [1990], ‘Substances and Spacetimes: What Aristotle Would have Said to Einstein,’ Studies
in the History and Philosophy of Science, 21: 531–61.
[20] Mundy, B. [1992]: ‘Space-Time and Isomorphism’, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the
Philosophy of Science Association, 1992:515-527.
[21] Roberts, B. [2014]: ‘Disregarding the Hole Argument’, unpublished manuscript.
[22] Rynasiewicz, R. [1994]: ‘The Lessons of the Hole Argument’, The British Journal for the Philosophy
of Science, 45, pp. 407–36.
[23] Rynasiewicz, R. [1996]: ‘Is There a Syntactic Solution to the Hole Problem?’, Philosophy of Science,
63:S55-S62.
[24] Teitel, T. [2019], ‘Holes in Spacetime: Some Neglected Essentials,’ Journal of Philosophy forthcoming.
[25] Wald, R. [1984] General Relativity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
[26] Weatherall, J. [2018]: ‘Regarding the Hole Argument’, British Journal for Philosophy of Science, 69,
329-350.
